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THESIS ABSTRACT

The argument
for the existence

from design is one of the most widely debated arguments

of God. There has been much written

criticism of the argument's
clarify these positions,
rationally

justified

basic structure

in support

and conclusion.

of and in

I shall attempt

and to argue that the thei?ti c account provides

explanation

of human life on earth

than

to

a more

the atheistic

account.
Many philosophers
"metaphysical
scientific

speculation."

empiricism

regardless

think that any proof for the existence

as the standard

of the subject

I shall formulate
theory

according

Many times these philosophers
for an "acceptable"

of God is mere

use the criteria
scientific

of

theory,

matter.
the argument

from design

to the school of scientific

as an empirical

falsificationism

as stated

scientific
by Karl

Popper.
The principal
recent

articles

philosophical

and texts
implications

The results
formulate

literature

which discuss

relevant

for the argument

of this investigation

an argument

of the falsificationists

to be investigated

for the existence
school of scientific

ii

in this study will be the most
scientific

data,

and their

from design.
demonstrate

that

it is possible

to

of God which meets all of the criteria
empiricism.
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INTRODUCTION

St. Paul in his letter
the world God's invisible
have been clearly seen,
men are without
scientific

argument,
1

•

qualities

- his eternal

being understood

excuse"

of

power and divine nature

-

from what has been made, so that

(NIV. Romans 1: 20).

argument

from

design,

also

Is this religious

ref erred

is one of the most widely debated

Much has been written in support

basic structure

and conclusion.

to argue

the

that

explanation

theistic

dogma or

Thomas Aquinas,

arguments

teleological

for the existence

provides

a more rationally

which will be discussed

and William Paley.

and

justified

account.

the classical statements

statements

of

of and in criticism of the argument's

of nat:ural order than the atheistic

The classical

to as the

I shall attempt to clarify these _positions,

account

I shall begin by discussing
design.

"For since the creation

fact?

The

God

to the Romans states,

of the argument

from

are those by Plato,

This will give us a firm foundation

upon

which to proceed.
I shall then
critiques
discussed

discuss

the critiques

of the classical statements

of the classical

of the argument

statements.

The

from design which will be

are those by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles Darwin. This

1

For recent discussion in a public forum see Bryan Appleyard,
"Science
had better watch its language,"
which appeared in the Providence Journal
Bulletin, April 15, 1993; Robert Wright, "Science, God and Man," which
appeared in Time, December 28, 1992.
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discussion

will expose the possible

I then

proceed

to investigate

argument

from design as a scientific

scientific

restatement

of the classical

of formulating

I shall adopt the criterion

leading

exponent

of scientific

from design can be stated

natural

possibility

statements.

of establishing
I shall assess

from design responds

the

how the

to the critiques

from design.

the argument

established
falsificationism.

from design as a scientific

by Karl Popper.
2

I argue

Popper was the

that

in such a way that it fulfills Popper's

the argument
criterion

of

.

It is within the context

scientific

of the classical

theory . Finally,

of the argument

theory,

falsification

the

of the argument

statements

For the purposes

weaknesses

of establishing

the argument

theory that I hope to prove that the theistic
order is more reasonable

than the atheistic

2

from design as a

account of instances

of

account.

For a similar discussion regarding The Cosmologial Argument see Galen
A. Johnson,
"Harshorne's
Argument
Against
Empirical Evidence
For
Necessary Existence: An Evaluation,"
Religious Studies. Vol. 13, pp. 175187.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CLASSICAL STATEMENTS

Plato
Th e earliest

statement

of the argument

of Plato's Laws. In the context of discussing
violate religious
raise

laws, the interlocutors,

the question

from design is found in Book X
possible penalties

for those who

Cleinias and the Athenian

of how the existence

Stranger,

of the gods might be proven

to

atheists.
It is agreed

under

by both Cleinias and the Athenian

the law should be administered

question

to these people,

that before punishment
they have the right to

the basis of these laws which they are supposed

namely, the existence
the Athenian

represents

of the gods. Anticipating

to have violated,

the questions

of these people,

them as saying,

Gentlemen of Athens, of Sparta, and of Crete, you are quite right .
Some of us are indeed absolute atheists, whereas others do believe in
such gods as you describe . So we demand of you what you yourselves
demanded of the laws, that before you resort to threats and bullying,
you should try to convince us by argument and cogent proofs that gods
do exist, and that they are in fact above being seduced by gifts into
turning a blind eye to injustice. (Plato 1970, 885-886).
It is in response

the argument
expressed
existence

to this demand that we are given the first statement

from design.

Cleinias'

response

to his potential

by the Athenian is that surely there is no difficulty

situation
in proving

of
as
the

of the gods. When the Athenian asks Cleinias to explicate this proof,

Cleinias replies,

3

Well, just look at the earth and the sun and the stars and the u nivers e
in general; look at the wonderful procession of th e seasons and its
articulation into years and months! (Plato 1970, 886-887).
Here we see Plato arguing

that the undeniable

order in the heavens

and in the world obviously

gods. Plato continues

his argument

finally

dependent

natural

mechanism or chance.

of the gods,

fa ct of the existence

proves

th e existence

of

of the

to conclude that all physical movements are

upon the motions of soul or mind and not due to either
Regarding

a

the question of proving the existence

Plato concludes,

Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and months and
all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or
souls - and perfectly virtuous souls at that - have been shown to be the
cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence
in matter that they direct all the heavens or by some other means, we
shall insist that these souls are gods . (Plato 1970 , 899 - 900).
It is interesting

to note here that Plato is employing the argument

design as a proof for the existence

of the gods to counter

fr om

a familiar atheistic

argument.
This
existence

familiar

atheistic

by either nature

argument

or chance.

is that

all things

Plato stating

have

this argument

come into
says,

They maintain that fire, water, earth, and air owe their existence to
nature an d chance, and in no case to art, and that it is by means of
these entirely inanimate substances that the secondary physical bodies
- the earth, sun, moon, and stars - have been produc ed. These
substances
moved at random, each impelled b y virtue of its own
inherent properties,
which depended on various suitable amalgamations
of hot and cold, dry and wet, soft and hard, and all other haphazard
combinations
that inevitably resulted when the opposites were mixed.
This is the process to which all the heavens and everything
that is in
them owe their birth, and consequent establishment of the four seasons
led to the appearance of all plants and living creatures.
The cause of
all this, they say, was neither intelligent planning,
nor a deity, nor
art, but - as we've explained - nature and chance.
(Plato 1970,
889- 890).
For Plato,
laws and chance.

the world was unintelligible

in terms of mechanical

Order of the kind that was clearly observable
4

natural

in the heavens

could only originate

through

mind or soul. Plato did not accept the idea that

matter could be self-ordering
an organism

or self-moving.

The world was to be viewed as

or a work of art.

As we shall see, this t yp e of atheistic

argument

is still very much aliv e

today.

St. Thomas Aquinas
The
philosopher,
Theologica
statement

argument

from

Thomas
(la,

design

Aquinas

was

also

(1225-1274).

and worth quoting

from design.

in their entirety

3

by

In his works

2, 3) and Summa Contra Gentiles

of the argument

utilized

the

medieval

entitled

Summa

(1, 13), Aquinas offers his

These passages

are relatively

. In Summa Theologi ca, Aquinas

short
says,

The fifth way is based on the guidedness of nature. An orderedness
of
actions to an end is observed in all bodies obeying natural laws, even
when they lack awareness.
For their behavior hardly ever varies, and
will practically always turn out well; which shows that they truly tend
to a goal, and do not merely hit it by accident. Nothing however that
lacks awareness tends to goal, except under the direction of someone
with awareness and with understanding;
the arrow, for example,
requires an archer. Everything in nature, therefore,
is directed to its
goal by someone with understanding,
and this we call "God" (Aquinas
1964, 17).
In Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas says,
Another proof, taken from the governance of things, is introduced by
Damascene and mentioned by Averroes.
Contrary
and discordant
elements, it runs, cannot always, or nearly always, work harmoniously
together unless they be directed by something providing each and all
with their tendencies to a definite end. Now in the universe we see
things of diverse natures conspiring together in one scheme, not rarely
or haphazardly,
but approximately always or for the most part. There
must be something, therefore,
whose providence directs the universe
(Aquinas 1956, 63).
Here we see that,

3

See A. Kenny,

according

to Aquinas,

The Five Ways.
5

some things,

such as natural

bodies,

act for an end despite

knowledge

or awareness.

These different

do with definite

kinds of things,

purposes

is a stable order

bodies

co-operate

in maintaining

bodies intentionally

unconsciously

or system.

have no

F.C.

a

act as

that different

co-operate

Copleston,

in such

in his work

Aquinas says,
And his argument is that this
material things clearly points
author of this co-operation,
Aquinas had lived in the days
doubtless
have argued that
invalidates the conclusion of
Aquinas

experience.

held

that

should

It

this
also

co-operation on the part of heterogeneous
to the existence of an extrinsic intelligent
who operates with an end in view. If
of the evolutionary hypothesis,
he would
this hypothesis
supports
rather than
the argument.
(Copleston 1963, 122).

co-operation
be

noted

is demonstrated
that

generalizations

. He does not say that all natural

an established

world order,

but approximately

Aquinas has also framed this argument
analysis.
ends.

It is the observed

These

relation

observe

individually,

or severally

sweeping

bodies always co-operate

objects

directing

within the context
things

of means end
realize

certain

taken as separate

of a greater

activity

is for an end . If all activity

in

is the notion that

toward

cause.

specific

ends,

these objects.

do not completely

whole.

directed

of this argument

as part

in

or for the most part.

Implied in this argument

inanimate

There are two implications
of being

avoids

toward a specific end without an intelligent

must be an intelligence

all activities

in ordinary

of being which can only be explained

to an end not yet realized.

Since we clearly

Aquinas

means by which natural

means are activities

means cannot be directed

there

natural

in mind, but rather,

such as earth and water,

a way that there
entitled

things

It is not that these natural

stable order or system.
human beings

the fact that these

capture

as stated.

The first is that

the essence

individual

of their

constituents,

The second is that "agere

est propter

end

but only
finem,"

is for an end, then the end of the activity
6

can be vie we d as he reason for the activit y . Reas ons for act ivi t y pr esupp ose
some sort of intelligence

where the reas on resid es .

William Paley
Probabl y the best kn own statem ent of the argume n t of design was th at
pu t for th by William Paley (1 743-1805) in hi s work entitled Natural
or Evid en ce s of the Existen ce and Attributes
App earances

of Nature p ublished

Paley argues

fr om a now famous analogy

Watchmaker."
designer
during

in 1802.

Here Paley argues

4

of t he Deity Colle ct e d from th e
In the first chapter

referred

stroll,

from our inspection

that just as we would infer an intellig ent

we are justified

of the universe.

of this work,

to as "T he Watch and th e

from our inspe ction of a watch accidentally
a leisurely

T h eol ogy,

in inferring

found

on the ground

an in t elligent

designe r

As Paley says,

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitch my foot against a stone, and wer e
asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answ er, that ,
for anything I knew to the contrary,
it had lain t here fore ver: nor
would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdit y of this answer.
But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground and it should b e
inquir ed how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly
think of the answer which I had before gi v en, that, for anything I
knew, the watch might have been always there. Yet why should not this
answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? For this reason,
and for no other, viz . that, when we come to inspect the wat ch, we
perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several
parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e .g. that t hey are so
formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated
as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had
been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other
manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed,
either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or
none which would hav e answered the use that is now served by it (Paley
1856,5) .
Pale y reasons

that as the existence

4

of order and purposefulness

in a

For other discussion of Paley's argument see Ric har d Swinburn,
The
the Existence of
Existence of God, pp. 133-136; John Hick, Arguments f
God, pp. 2-7.

7

watch is proof of an intelligent designer, so the manifest order and
purposefulness in the universe is proof of an intelligent designer of the
universe. Paley says that this inference is inevitable and justified.
This mechanism being observed, the inference, we think, is inevitable,
that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed,
at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who
formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who
comprehended its construction,.and designed its use (Paley 1956, 6).
Louis Pojman in his work entitled Philosophy: The Quest For Truth,
summarizes Paley's formulation as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Human artifacts are products of intelligent design
The universe resembles these human artifacts.
Therefore, (probably) the universe is a product of intelligent
design.
But the universe is much greater than a human artifact.
Therefore, the intelligent designer of the universe is much
greater than humans (Pojman 1992, 42).

At the end of Chapter 1, (Paley 1856, 6-8) Paley makes eight further
assertions which he feels are justified. These assertions are:
(1)

The fact that we have not actually seen the watch being made
does not in itself deter the conclusion that it is in fact the result
of some sort of intelligent design. This conclusion seems to be
justified by the watch itself without further reference to
anything.

(2)

The watch's failure to function exactly as designed or our
inability to determine all the correct functions of the individual
parts of the watch does not provide compelling evidence that the
watch is not the result of intelligent design.

(3)

Our inability to determine the function of all the individual parts
of the watch would still not cast doubt upon the inference that
the watch had been made by a watchmaker.
8

( 4)

No one would accept as an adequate
of the

watch,

determinate

with

end,

combination

its

that

explanation

specific
it was

parts
the

for the existence

functioning

result

for

its

of some possible

of material forms simply because

whatever

one had

found in place of the watch must have some material form. Here
the explanation
simply chance.

of the internal

explain the existence

in light

conjectured

of its

ordered

twenty-three

Concerning

Natural

Paley was directly

years

Religion.

is

some form

of this parti cular form,

parts.

that Paley was responding

published

of the watch

The fact that all objects must possess

does not adequately
especially

configuration

Here

it might

to the criticisms

earlier

in

Hume's

There is no direct

be

of Hume
Dialogues

evidence

that

familiar with Hume's work, but it would seem

likely that he was aware of this criticism.
(5)

No one would accept as an answer for the existence
the explanation

that it was created

Here Paley is referring
the different
configuration.
criticism.

parts

by "a principle

to self-ordering

Paley

of order."

matter which disposed

of the watch into their

Again,

of the watch

present

may be responding

form and
to Hume 's

As Paley says,

He never knew a watch made by the principle of order, nor can he even
form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct
from the intelligence of the watchmaker (Paley 1856, 7).
(6)

Does not the fact that some sort of mechanism is demonstrable
prove

(7)

that

in fact

a designer

imagination

of a designer?

Attempting

to explain

exists,

the existence
9

and

not

simply

an

of the watch by means of

referring to the idea of "laws of metallic nature" or the like is
based upon an incorrect understanding of the idea of "laws." All
laws presuppose a law giver or agent. It is understood that any
reference to laws implies that these laws were in fact created by
an agent(s) for whatever ends these agent(s) were trying to
accomplish. The expressions such as "the law of vegetable
nature," or the law of nature" are colloquialisms and should not
be misunderstood to refer to more than is proper.
(8)

Finally, no one would be satisfied by being told that because we
cannot

understand

everything

and

are

not

capable

of

comprehending the totality of things, we understand nothing at
all about this matter with the watch. Clearly we know what we
know and ignorance on other things does not diminish this.
At the beginning of Chapter 3, entitled "Application of the Argument,"
Paley summarizes his argument very eloquently:
Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of de� "n, which
exists in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference,
on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree
which exceeds all computation. I mean that the contrivances of nature
surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and
curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go
beyond them in number and variety; yet in a multitude of cases, are not
less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less
evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are
the most perfected productions of human ingenuity...(Palev 1856, 13).
Two other notable works which discuss the argument from design in
great depth are the "Boyle Lectures" which were a series of lectures on
Christian apologetics founded by a bequest from Robert Boyle (1627-1691),
and the "Bridgewater Treatises on the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God
as Manifest in the Creation" which includes 8 volumes written between
1833-1840.
10

In the nineteenth
design

had come under

renewed interest
Darwin.

and early twentieth
ever increasing

in the criticisms

I shall discuss

centuries,

scrutiny,

the argument

due in large

part

from
to a

of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Charles

these criticisms
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next.

CHAPTER 2
CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

Introduction
In this section, I shall discuss the three most influential criticisms of
the argument from design. These three criticisms are those developed by
David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Charles Darwin
(1809-1882).
Hume's criticism is from his famous Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion, which was published posthumously in 1779. Immanuel Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason, written in 1781, provides us with the second critique of the
argument from design. Specifically Kant discusses the impossibility of such
a proof for the existence of God in the second division, book 2, chapter 3,
section 6 entitled "The Impossibility of the Physico-theological Proof."
The final criticism of the argument from design which will be discussed
is found in Charles Darwin's book entitled The Origin of the Species. In this
work Darwin's theory of evolution provides the basis for the criticism of the
design argument.
It is only by careful study of the criticisms of the argument from design
that·one can understand the weaknesses of the argument. Do these criticisms
uncover an inherent weakness in the structure and claim of the proof for
God's existence from the design of the universe, or are these weaknesses
simply a result of particular formulations of an otherwise sound argument?
12

The Criticism of David Hume
In his work entitled, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the
Scottish empiricist and skeptic David Hume states what has been referred to
as the classical critique of the argument from design. 5
Hume wrote this work in dialogue form, modeled after Cicero's De
Natura Deorum. It has been speculated that Hume employed this technique to
conceal his true personal attitudes.

As a respected member of the

distinguished Edinburgh circle, Hume's devastating criticism of the most
popular argument for the existence of God would have had grave effects upon
his life style. Hume, in fact, finished this work at least fifteen years earlier,
but was convinced by his close friends not to publish it then. They reasoned
that even though he tried to mask his true opinion behind the characters in
the dialogue, the repercussions would be most unpleasant. The Dialogues were
published posthumously in 1779 by his nephew.
The Dialogues have three characters: Cleanthes, who represents the
natural theological position; Demea, who represents the orthodox position;
and Philo, who represents the skeptical position. It is the character of Philo
who, most scholars believe, voices Hume's true attitude on this subject.
Hume's first criticism is that the comparison between the universe and
human artifacts is unjustified. The similarity between these is not sufficient
for the conclusion which the argument from design attempts to draw. Hume
says,
But whenever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases,
you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring to a
very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty
(Hume 1947, 144).
5

See Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, pp. 95-111; J.P. Moreland,
Scaling the Secular City, pp. 62-67.
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Although this is a direct criticism of the argument from design, it is a
criticism which can be leveled at any form of argument which relies upon
analogy as a basic proof. Analogies by their nature are not perfect. There are
always some elements from each of the items being compared that do not
correspond exactly to one another. This is the reason why the analogy is
being used. Unfortunately, analogies are never strong enough as the basis for
a proof.
Just as Paley compared the universe to a watch, Hume's character Philo
compares the universe to a house. Although there are indeed some similarities,
Philo concludes by saying,
The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can here pretend to
is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and
how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to
consider (Hume 1947, 144).
Hume here is referring to the difference in species between Cleanthes'
analogy of a house and the universe. Hume correctly points out that when we
repeatedly experience a species of effect to proceed from a species of cause,
we conclude "with the greatest certainty" (Hume p. 147) that our inference
-is justified. But the justification for the inference is based upon the
experience of exactly the same kind of cause and effect relationships. I am
indeed justified in concluding that an architect or builder designed a certain
house that I might see precisely because I have experienced all previous
houses to have been designed by an architect or builder. The cause and the
effect in these instances are the same. The cause is the architect or builder
and the effect is a house. This is not the case with the analogy between a
house and the universe. In this instance, both the causes, God and human
architects different. Philo says,
Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence
14

in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every
alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and
it requi re s new experiments
to prove certainly
that the new
circumstances
are of no moment or importance (Hume 1947, 147).
Hume also argues that it is the principle
belief in similar effects
more we experience
belief.

of repetition

which justifies

from similar causes within a species.

this relationship,

the more justified

Therefore,

our
the

we will be in our

Philo says,
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined
together,
I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see
the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience
(Hume 1947, 149).
Since it is by repetition

to experien ce many universes
conjecture

that the inference

is justified,

one would have

in order to be in a position to make a reasonable

about the origin of our universe.

This argument

is reflected

in

Philo's words,
But how this argument can have place where the objects, as in the
present
case, are single, individual,
without parallel or specific
resemblance,
may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with
serious countenance
that an orderly universe must arise from some
thought and art like human because we have experience
of it? To
ascertain this reasoning it were requisite that we had experiences of the
origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient,
surely, that we have seen
ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance
(Hume 1947,
149).
Another
traditional
certain

of Hume's

argument

or necessary

against

criticisms

the inability

knowledge

origin.

foundation

teleological

of the inductive

about the world.

illusion to think that investigation
sufficient

of the

for judgements

argument

is the

method to ascertain

Hume argues

that it is an

of any specific part of a lar ·ger whole is a
about the whole, especially

the whale's

Hume says,
But allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature
upon another for the foundation of our judgment concerning the origin
of the whole (which never can be admitted), yet why select so minute,
so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of animals is
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found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little
agitation of the brain we call "thought",
that we must thus make it the
model of the whole
universe? Our partiality in our own favor does
indeed present
it on all occasions:
But sound philosophy
ought
carefully to guard against so natural an illusion (Hume 1947, 148).
We also see Hume point out that because we are automatically
to think that human reason is the perfect
should be on our guard against
According
the universe

model of how the universe

prejudiced
works,

we

this.

to Hume, if we are to conjecture

from the small part that we happen

anything

about the whole of

to inhabit,

we should think

the whole is extreme ly diverse in composition and not simply similar to a copy
of the earth.

Hume says,

When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in
this small globe, can we imagine that she incessantly
copies herself
throughout
so immense a universe? ... Nature, we find, even from our
limited experience,
possesses
an infinite number of springs
and
principles which incessantly
discover themselves on every change of
her position and situation (Hume 1947, 148).
Hume also points out that even if one were to grant
design

its premises

artifacts,

which state

that

the universe

one could not logically conclude

the argument

is analogous

that the designer

to human

of the universe

had any cla im to infinite qualities because the effect is not sufficient
such a description

from

to justify

of the cause .

First, by this method of reasoning you renounce all claim to infinity in
any of the attributes
of the Deity. For, as the cause ought to be
proporti oned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our
cognization,
is not infinite; what pretensions
have we, upon your
suppositions,
to ascribe that attribute to the divine Being? You will still
insist, that by removing him so much from all similarity to human
creatures,
we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis,
and at the same
time weaken all proofs of his existence (Hume 1947, 166).
A further
stated

criticism

by the argument

only one designer

made by Hume is that again,
from design are granted,

is no more probable

even if the premises

the desired

than the conclusion
16

conclusion

of

that the universe

was designed

by several

designers

of the efforts

of several

individuals

. Are not many human artifac t s the result
? As Philo says,

And what shadow of an argument can y ou produce from your hypothesis
to prove the unity of the Deity ? A great numb er of men join in building
a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may
not sev eral deities combine in contriving and framing a world ? ( Hume
1947 , 167).
But it is not Hume 's intention
from design
universe

their

to grant the proponents

st at ed premises . Hume can grant

do es exhibit

instances

of order,

problem which must be addressed
to account

by the proponent

from design

108-111).

(ontological

of God, then these limitations

God and

to support

omnipotent,

to these further
for .

Finally , Hume does not think it is enough for the proponents
argument

from design

conclusions.
the Existence

Rather,

to demonstrate

instances

of order

and

Hume acknowledges

argument)

can be accounted

in the

to the problem of

premises which logically conclude the omniscient,

omnibenevolen t attr ibutes of God (Plantinga,

is how

difficulties

in his work entitled

of the argument

that if we argue on a priori grounds,

of the

of this argument

that in this criticism Hume is referring

evil in the world and the inability
empirically

our part

as the theist says , but the larger

works of nature " (Hume, 167) . Alvi n Plantinga,

attributes

that

for the disor der a n d the "many inexplicable

Other Minds , argues

of the argument

of the

as proof for their

as John Hick states in his work entitled

Arguments

for

of God,

In other words, it is not sufficient, as warrant for an inference from
the world to God, to show that the world is an orderly
and
self-sustaining
system. It must also be shown that this order could not
have come about except by divine activity (Hick 1971, 10).
According
such

to Hume, this is exactly what cannot be done. He considers

an attempt

self-ordering.

to be begging

the question

Hume says:
17

because

perhaps

matter

is

To say that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately
from design is begging the question;
nor can that great point be
ascertained otherwise than by proving a priori, both that order is, from
its nature, inseparably
attached to thought, and that it can never, of
itself, or from original unknown principle,
belong to matter ( Hume
1947, 179).
A further
by Nietzsche's

conjecture

that Hume voices is one which will later be echoed

idea of recurrence.

Given a finite amount of matter

infinite amount of time, all possible combinations
as simply the result

of probability,

and an

of matter will not only occur

but occur an infinite

number of times.

Instead of supposing matter infinite, as Epicurus did; let us suppose
it finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible
of finite
transpositions:
And it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every
possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times.
This world, therefore,
with all its events, even the most minute, has
before been produced and destroyed,
and will again be produced and
destroyed,
without any bounds and limitations.
No one, who has a
concepti on of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever
scruple this determination
(Hume 1947, 182).

The Criticism of Immanuel Kant.
Immanuel Kant discusses
work The Critique

his critique

of the teleological

of Pure Reason in the section entitled

of the Physico-Theological
Kant is attempting

argument

in his

"The Impossibility

Proof. "
to determine

if it is possible

that

[a] determinate experience, the experience of the things of the present
world, and the constitution and order of these, does not provide the
basis of a proof which may help us to attain to an assured conviction of
a supreme being (Kant 1965, 518).
Kant does not think it possible
necessary)

idea of a necessary

from a pure
overwhelmingly
supply

empirical
great

the necessary

that the transcendental

and all-sufficient

investigation.
that

nothing

to Kant,

in our immediate
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and

original being can be derived

According

link to such a concept.

(universal

the idea is so

experience

can ever

if we try to derive the concept

Kant asks whether,

of this being by

postulating

that this being is itself part of the world, would it not have to be

contingent

upon other beings as all beings in this world are. We do not have

any experience

in this world of any other type of beings.

hold that this supreme
experience
postulate

being exists

in this great

shows that contingency

Therefore,

continuum

if we

of being,

must be part of its nature.

then

If we try to

that this supreme being is not part of this world, but separate

it, what determinate

experience

can we look to for evidence

from

in favor of this?

As Kant says,
For all laws governing
the transition
from effects to causes,
all
synthesis and extension of our knowledge, refer to nothing but possible
experience,
and therefore solely t o ob jects of the sensible world, and
apart from them can have no meaning whatsoever (Kant 1956, 519).
Kant summarizes

the chief points

of the physico-theological

proof as

follows;
( 1)

Everywhere

in the world we see evidence

with a determinate
world

displays

purpose,
great

carried

variety

of order in accordance

out with great wisdom. The

of content

and is unlimited

in

extent.
(2)

The purposive

order is not intrinsic

but only belongs
order

(3)

imparted

to the things

to them contingently,

having

to them by an ordering

conformity

with underlying

Therefore

there exists an intelligent

of the world

this purposive

rational

principle

in

ideas.
cause that works through

freedom.
( 4)

The unity

of this cause may be inferred

reciprocal

relations

members

of an

existing

artfully

between
arranged
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from the unity

the parts
structure

of the

of the world as
inferred

with

certainty

in

verification,
accordance
Kant concludes

so

far

and

as

beyond

our

observation

these

limits

with prin ciples of analogy
that

for the proponents

suffices

with

for

probability,

of the argument

[inferred]
with certaint y in so far as our observation
v erification,
and b eyond these limits with probability,
with the principle of analogy ( Kant 1956, 521) .
Kant points out that the most this argument

the main

of this world happens
upon some prior

to possess

determination

is,

suffices for its
in accordanc e

can hope to prove is the

of the form of the world , not the contingency

the world. In other words, the determinate

in

(Kant 1956, 512).

infer en ce from the unity of the world to that of an int elligent designer

contingency

its

of the substance

form that any particular

of

substanc e

at any one time may indeed be contingent

the substance

happened

prove that the matt er of the world was contingent

to possess.

But,

to

we would hav e to,

demonstrate
that the things in the world would not themselves be
capable of such order and harmony, in accordance wit h universal laws,
if they were not in their substance the product of supreme wisdom
(Kant 1956, 522) .
According
that provided
argument

to Kant , this would require

a different

basis of proof than

from analogy with human art which he thinks

employs.

Therefore,

the most this argument

the teleological

can prove is that there

is,
an architect of the world who is always very much hampered by the
adaptability
of the material in which he works , not a creator of the
world to whose idea everything is subject (Kant 1956, 522).
Kant thinks that to prove the contingency
employ a transcendental
beyond anything

argument

of matter one would have to

by means of concepts

which are above and

empirical to which the teleological argument

One might

argue

that

contingency

of matter .

the

cosmological
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argument

is able

is restricted

to.

to prove

the

Kant sees the inference
purposiveness

of nature to that of an omnipotent,

being as e mploying
teleological

from the determinate

concepts

advancing

deals.

As he says,

argument

beyond

experiences

necessary

of order and

and all-sufficient

empirical grounds

which the

Now no one, I trust, will be so bold as to profess that he comprehends
the relation of the magnitude of the world as he has observed it (alike
as regards both extent and content) to omnipotence, of the world order
to supreme wisdom, of the world unity to the absolute unity of its
Author,
etc. Physico-theology
is therefore
unable to give any
determinate
concept of the supreme cause of the world, and cannot
therefore serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn
to form the basis of religion (Kant 1956, 523).
Kant states
oldest,

clearest

that this proof always deserves
and most appealing

mankind has reasoned.
that it is impossible

proof

respect

because

for the existence

of God that

Although he holds this proof in high regard,

to prove the existence

he thinks

of God on empirical grounds

In order to achieve what the theist wants,
employ means beyond those available

it is the

alone .

Kant says that one must ultimately

to a strictly

empirical proof.

He says,

The physico-theological
argument can indeed lead us to the point of
admiring the greatness,
wisdom, power, etc., of the Author of the
world, but can take us no further.
Accordingly,
we then abandon the
argument from empirical grounds of proof, and fall back upon the
contingency which, in the first steps of the argument, we had inferred
from order and purposiveness
of the world. With this contingency as
our sole premiss (sic), we then advance, by means of transcendental
concepts al one, to the existence of an absolutely necessary being, and
(as a final step) from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first
cause to the completely determinate or determinable
concept of that
necessary being, namely, to the concept of an all-embracing
reality
(Kant 1956, 523).

Charles
In the latter

Darwin and the Theory of Evolution

half of the 19th century,
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the argument

from design came

under

increasing

Although

from the proponents

the idea of evolution

been evolutionary
first

attack

to present

theories

of the theory

did not originate

6

of evolution.

with Dar win, there

having

since early Indian and Greek times, Darwin was the

a clear p roo f for the explanation

According

variation

in and among species type is not due to some act of special creation

species

r al intervention,

better

adapted

off, the more suitably
entitled,

of natural

selection,

actually

worked.

or supernatu

to Darwin 's doctrine

of how evolution

but by the generational

to changing
adapted

The Origin of Species,

environmental

species

reproduce

descent

conditions.

the

great

of modified

As species

and survive.

die

In his work

Darwin says,

Owing to this struggle for life, any variation, however slight and from
whatever cause proceeding,
if it be in any degree profitable to an
individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other
organic beings and to external nature, will tend to the preservation
of
that individual,
and will generally be inherited
by its offspring.
(Darwin 1988, 114).
Inspired

by the five - year voyage on the Beagle (1831-1836),

was convinced
in species.
acquired

that natural selection was the only explanation
In conjunction

characteristics,

Darwin's

account for the transmission
generations.

with sexual

selection

doctrine

Darwin's

survival

explanation

for the mutation by means of spontaneous
Although

of natural

of the required

This was a superior

the laws of inheritance

time, there were a number

progeny
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selection
characteristic

of

was able to
through

in the adult organism.

of inheritance

for natural

resemble their parents,

See Kenneth V. Nelson, "Evolution
Religious Studies. Vol. 14, pp. 423-443.

the inheritance

were for the most part unknown

of phenomena

6

for the variation

to those which tried to account

changes

known and Darwin used these as evidence
that although

and

Darwin

in

that were

selection . It is a fact

they are slightly varied in some

and the Argument

From Design,"

degree.

Darwin

held

that

some of these

variations

are

better

survival

adaptations.
According
blind

struggle

to Darwin,

nature

for survival.

Man was a mutation,

struggled

with other organisms

selection

upon random variation

from design.

These attacks

in his book entitled

was the product

for survival.

albeit

the attacks

which

of natural

upon the argument

best summed up by Richard

The Blind Watchmaker

and a

intelligent,

It was the operation

which launched

are probably

of blind chance

Dawkins

when he says,

All appearances
to the contrary,
the only watchmaker in nature is the
blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way. A true
watchmaker has foresight:
he designs his cogs and springs,
and plans
their interconnections,
with a future purpose in his mind's eye. Natural
selection,
the blind, unconscious,
automatic process which Darwin
discovered,
and which we now know is the explanation for the existence
and apparently
purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It
has no mind and no mind's eye. It does not plan for the future. It has
no vision, no foresight,
no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role
of watchmaker,
in nature, it is the blind watchmaker (Dawkins 1986,

6).
Natural
offspring

selection

rules

out design

are either useful or not useful.

necessarily

progressive).

and the individual
possessing
is no reason

beyond

by the struggle

Charles

claims that it is generally

selection

effectively

demolished

variation

for survival

in

is not

of one variation
and individual

of the fittest.

There

fact of nature.

Gillespie

the existence

for the survival

it is that the alternative

this brute

In his book entitled

(Darwin did say that evolution

The only reason

possessing

it are eliminated

in the following way: variations

Darwin and the Problem of Creation,
agreed

that Darwin's

William Paley's

classical

doctrine

Neal

of natural

design argument

for

of God. He says,

By showing how blind and gradual adaption could counterfeit
the
apparently purposeful design that Paley, the Bridgewater writers, and
others had seen in the contrivances
of nature, Darwin deprived their
argument of the analogical inference that the evident purpose to be seen
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in the contrivances by which means and ends were related in nature was
necessarily a function of mind ( Gillespie 1979, 83-84).
Further evidence that the "contrivances" are not the result of design
is the fact that not all variations promoted survival. Most mutations are
harmful and cause death to their possessors. Unknown to Darwin, the ultimate
source of genetic mutation is DNA, which is the genetic material. Due to its
structure, the DNA molecule is intrinsically vulnerable. Spontaneous changes
occur frequently and are considered to be random in that these mutations do
not necessarily serve the animal's needs. Mary Maxwell, in her book entitled
Human Evolution: A Philosophical Anthropology, makes an interesting point
when she says that Darwin's case against teleology is strengthened when one
consults the actual historical record which she thinks is merely the outcome
of immense series of chances. She says,
...we should see it against a whole inventory of other possible histories
which could very well have taken place instead. I believe that part of
the reason why we assume that there is a design in Nature is that we
see only the final results, for example the aerodynamic perfection of the
hummingbird, as mentioned earlier. But in fact evolution is messy.
There were many blind alleys in phylogenetic history; indeed, the vast
majority of species which evolved over time (some say 99 per cent) have
become extinct. Furthermore, even the genes we carry today do not all
seem to be used; it is not known what their function is (Maxwell 1970,
41).
The argument from evolution which is used against the argument from
design is based upon the argument that the apparent design one sees in
nature is really the result of random variations which spontaneously occur in
nature. The variations which continue to exist are simply those which are
more adapted to the ever changing environment. The proponents of this
argument point to natural history as evidence.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT REVISITED

Introduction
Many philosophers

think that any argument

"mere metaphysical

speculation."

criteria

of scientific

empiricism as the standard

theory,

regardless

The Structure
how the

formulated

Many times these

of scientific

to ask whether

for an "acceptable"

and the insights

theories

scientific

empiricism.

argument

from design as an empirical scientific

There are currently
scientific

empiricism.

several
7

explore

the

including

conventionalism,

jus tif ica tionism

( Sect.

sophisticated

of

in Philosophical

Foundations

of

schools

to verificationists
Criticism and the

of scientific

methodological

1 , 2 , and 3 of "Falsification

7

the

the criteria

2) . Imre Lakatos in his work entitled
several

of

regarding

methodol ogy ( Chapter

discusses

criteria

theory .

empiricism should proceed according

of Knowledge

it is still

of formulating

Physics that scientific

Growth

scientific

of God can be

acceptable

possibility

schools of thought

Rudolf Carnap argued

use the

Kuhn's work,

change,

for the existence

in such a way so as to fulfill the currently

of God is

it gives us regarding

and paradigms

any argument

I shall

philosophers

matter . While acknowledging

of Scientific Revolutions,

nature

appropriate

of the subject

for the existence

methodology

falsificationism,
and Methodology

and
of

For an anthology on this subject see the essays included in Janet A.
Kourany,
Scientific
Knowledge,
Part 3, "The Validation
of Scientific
Knowledge," pp. 112-227.
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Scientific

Research

One major
empiricism

Programs").
school

of thought

regarding

is that of falsificationism.

exponents

of falsificationism,

works entitled
Discovery.

Karl Popper

and presented

Science: Conjectures

For the purposes

the

criteria

was one of the leading

and defended

and Refutation

of this paper,

of scientific

that position in his

and The Logic of Scientific

I will adopt Popper's

criteria

of

falsification.

Revised Teleological Argument
I shall consider
existence
discuss

a form of the argument

of God from our experience

of instances

the notion of natural order in greater

not count as instances
in nature

of natural

I shall

detail later in this paper.

I shall

which appear randomly

of the argument from design in modus

form:

If there

are instances

intelligent

There are instances

(3)

Therefore,

depends

antecedent-consequent
and the existence
required

of natural

(by modus ponens)

these instances
The acceptance

of natural

order

design of these instances

(2)

antecedent,

order.

the

from time to time.

ponens argument

design

which infers

of natural

order those patterns

Consider the following formulation

(1)

from design

of natural

of the truth
upon

the

relation
of a designer
for premise

order

of natural

order

in premise
(D).

there

order

there

is

(D).

is intelligent

design

of

(D).

of

that there is intelligent

the

(1) between

The evidence

(2), is provided
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then

(NO).

of the conclusion
strength

(NO),

evidence
natural

for
order

for the truth

the
(NO)
of the

in section 3.4 and I shall

argue

in

se ction

3. 6

antecedent-consequent

for

the

acceptance

the

truth · of

the

relation.

The Scientific
Recall Popper's

Criterion

method of empirical falsification.

for a claim to qualify as empirical,
evidence

of

from experience

a minimal requirement

which would indicate

writes in The Logic of Scientific

According

to Popper,

is that there be some

the claim to be false.

Popper

Discovery,

But I shall admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable
of being tested by experience.
These considerations
suggest that not
the verifiability
but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a
criteria of demarcation.
In other words: I shall not require of a
scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and
for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall
be su ch that it can be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a
negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to
be refuted by experience.
(Popper 1959, 40-41).
It is important

to point out that Popper argued

empirical science from pseudo-science
statements

that what differentiated

was that the "objectivity"

lay in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively

of scientific

tested.

Popper

says,
Kant was perhaps the first to realize that the objectivity of scientific
statements is closely connected with the construction of theories - with
the use of hypotheses
and universal statements.
Only when certain
events recur in accordance with rules or regularities,
as in the case
with repeatable
experiments,
can our observations
be tested - in
principle - by anyone. We do not take even our own observations
quite
seriously,
or accept them as scientific observations,
until we have
repeated and tested them. Only by such repetitions
can we convince
ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere isolated "coincidence",
but with events
which,
on account
of their
regularity
and
reproducibility,
are in principle inter-subjectively
testable (Popper
1959,45).
~
It is clear
experiment
statements,

that

Popper

under controlled

defines

conditions.

known as predictions,

an empirical
The procedure

are deduced
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test

as a repeatable

is deductive.

from the general

Singular
theory

and

are then tested.

As Popper says,

Next we seek a decision as regards
these (and other)
derived
statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications
and experiments.
If this decision is positive, that is, if the singular
conclusions turn out to be accepted, or verified, then the theory has,
for the time being, passed its test: we have no reasons to discard it.
But if the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions
have been falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from
which they were logically deduced (Popper 1959, 33).
Although
instances
narrow

a theist

of natural
and

recognized

would argue

that the derived

order fulfill this criterion,

somewhat

arbitrary

nature

statements

she might also object to the

of this

criterion.

Thomas

this problem as well, but held that it was an inevitable

for the existence

of science.

In The Structure

asserting

of Scientific

Kuhn

condition

Revolutions

he

says,
Ought we to conclude from the frequency with which such instrumental
commitments prove misleading that science should abandon standard
tests and standard instruments?
Paradigm procedures and application
are as necessary to science as paradigm laws and theories, and they
have the same effects. Inevitably they restrict the phenomenological
field assessable for scientific investigation
at any given time (Kuhn
1970, 60).
Popper argued
and

cannot

verifiable

that empirical strict universal

be verified,

and

and are not falsifiable.

empirical
8

strict

statements
existential

are falsifiable
statements

are

Again Popper writes,

Strict or pure statements,
whether universal or existential,
are not
limited to space and time. They do not ref er to an individual,
restricted,
spatio-temporal
region.
This is the reason why strict
existential statements are not falsifiable. We cannot search the whole
world in order to establish that something does not exist, has never
existed, and will never exist. It is for precisely the same reason that
strict universal statements are not verifiable. Again, we cannot search
the whole world in order to make sure that nothing exists which the law
forbids.
Nevertheless,
both kinds of strict
statements,
strictly
For further information on the formalization of universal and existential
statements and logical derivations see Merrie Bergmann, James Moor and Jack
Nelson, The Logic Book, "Predicate Logic: Symbolization and Syntax," pp.
233-310.
8
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......;•

existential and strictly universal, are in principle empirically decidable;
each, however, in one way only: they are unilaterally decidable.
Whenever it is found that something exists here or there, a strictly
existential statement may be verified, or a universal one falsified
(Popper 1959, 70).
Popper argued that the only "acceptable" method for scientific
empiricism to employ is that of modus tollens (denying the consequent)

..->

>

argument form. Popper says,
Consequently it is possible by means of purely deductive inferences
(with the he_lp of the modus tollens of classical logic) to argue from the
truth of singular statements to the falsity of universal statements. Such
an argument to the falsity of universal statements is the only strictly
deductive kind of inference that proceeds, as it were, in the 'inductive
direction'; that is, from singular to universal statements (Popper 1963,
41).
In this way, Popper tried to avoid the problem of induction which
occurs when scientists employ the modus ponens form and commit the fallacy
of affirming the consequent.

.....

Modern analysis of the problem of induction begins with Hume and his
celebrated analysis of causation in his work entitled Enquiry Concerning the
Human Understanding (Sec 5, Part 1). The problem of induction is that it is
impossible to derive a universal statement from any number of existential
statements. That is, no amount of specifically confirming instances can verify
a universal law. For example, P (universal law) cannot be experimentally
verified by particular instances of Q (P holding). The fallacy is shown as
follows:

>

(4)

If P (universal law), then Q (particular instance).

(5)

Q (particular instance of P holding).

(6)

Therefore, P (universal law).

Thus Popper says in Conjectures and Refutations, "Every genuine test
of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it" (Popper 1963, 63). In
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other words, only one instance of a weight not falling when dropped from a
tower disconfirms the universal law of gravity, while no number of instances
of a weight actually falling from a tower when dropped can confirm the
universal law of gravity. Popper does allow for corroboration of universal laws
based upon confirming instances.
The argument from design as stated fulfills Popper's falsification
criterion. All experiences of natural order may be taken as falsification of the
negative hypothesis that a designer do_es not exist. In this case, the modus
ponens argument may be translated via the rule of replacement known as
9

transposition into the modus tollens form:
(7)

If there is not intelligent design ( -D), then there are no
instances of natural order (-NA).

Ir

(8)

There are instances of natural order (NA).

(9)

Therefore, (by modus tollens), there is intelligent design (D).

The experience we have of instances of natural order falsifies God's
non-existence.

Instances of Natural Order
The term "natural order" refers to instances in nature of repeating
patterns.

These repeating patterns exhibit uniformity, symmetry and

predictability.
.,.

10

It is precisely because these instances of natural order are

predictable and repeating that the theist argues they fulfill Popper's criterion
of inter-subjectivity and can be verified.

9

See Bergmann et al., The Logic Book, p. 189.

10

See Moreland, Scaling the Secular City, p. 43-56; Swinburne, "The
Argument From Design," Philosophy, Vol 43, 1968, pp. 199-212.
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I would like to discuss three types of natural order which are evident
in this world. The three types are spatial order, temporal order, and
informational order.

Spatial Order
I shall refer to instances of spatial order as instances of co-presence
and distinguish co-presence from co-incidence by repetition. Co-presence is
characterized by the repeating arrangement of a certain structure. I shall
discuss the instances of atomic co-presence and anatomical co-presence.
The simplest and most striking example of co-present order is that of
the atom. Every electron that revolves around its nucleus does not revolve at
just any distance from the nucleus. These orbits or shells have specific
energy levels and can only contain a certain number of electrons. When any
atom has more electrons than a specific shell can hold, the additional electrons
begin to fill up the next shell. The atomic orbits of all electrons for each of the
specific elements are identically spatially ordered. The electronic structure
of even the most complex atoms can be viewed as a succession of filled levels
increasing in energy, with the outermost electrons primarily responsible for
the chemical properties of the element. Niels Bohr won the Nobel Prize in 1922
for this discovery. One of the basic ideas of quantum theory and quantum
mechanics is that as these electrons jump from one shell or orbit to the next
they move in discrete jumps exhibiting only a certain specific amount of
energy. While studying blackbody radiation in 1900, Max Planck discovered
that energy is absorbed and emitted in specific amounts. He called these
amounts "quanta." In other words, these jumps from different orbits are not
gradual but discrete. There is no in between position. The periodic table of
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There is a great deal more order in the world than is necessary for the
existence of humans. So men could still be around to comment on the
fact even if the world were a much less orderly place than it is ... The
Teleologist's starting point is not that we perceive order rather than
disorder,
but that order rather than disorder is there . (Swinburne
1969, 136).
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See Ian Hacking, "The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy: the Argument From
Design.
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in Cosmology: The Anthropic Principle"; Joseph M. Zycinski,
"The Anthropic Principle and Teleological Interpretations
of Nature."
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See J.P.

Moreland,
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City, pp. 51-52.

Information

Theory"

said,

Information theory, in the more general sense it has developed over the
past forty years,
is concerned
with all processes
in which the
spatio-temporal
form of one set of objects or events (at A) determines
the form of another set (at B) without explicit regard for the energetics
involved. These are situations in which we say that information flows
from A to B. In the operational context, then, we can define information
as that which determines form, in much the same way as force is defined
in physics as that which produces acceleration (Machlup 1983, 486).
Both energy and information
Mackay differentiates

are operationally

defined by what they do.

the two as follows,

Whereas the work done by energy is physical in character,
the work
done by information is logical work. In talking about information, there
is always a suppressed
reference to a third party, since, as in the
physical theory of relativity,
we have to relate our definitions to an
observer, actual or potential, before they become operationally precise"
(Machlup 1983, 486).
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order
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material.
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of Eden writes,

But complexity can also be judged by the minimum information content
in the organism's genetic material. A typical human chromosome has one
very long DNA molecule wound into coils, so that the space it occupies
is very much smaller than it would be if it were unraveled.
This DNA
molecule is composed of smaller building blocks, a little like the rungs
and sides of a rope ladder. These blocks are called nucleotides and
come in four varieties.
The language
of life, our hereditary
information, is determined by the sequence of the four different sorts
of nucleotides ... The genetic instruction of all the other taxa on Earth
are written in the same language, with the same code book (Sagan 1977,
23).

It is an accepted

idea that information
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is transmitted

between

genetic

material. Most introductory textbooks in modern genetics devote entire
chapters to the topic. A typical example of this is seen in An Introduction To
Modern Genetics by Donald Patt and Gail Patt. Chapter 4 of this book is
entitled, "Transmission of Genetic Information" (Patt, 51-78) and is devoted
entirely to the discussion of information transfer between genetic material.
All books on genetics also make use of linguistic terms. In the 12th
volume of Frontiers of Biology which is entitled "The Biological Code", editors
A. Neuberger and E.L. Tatum make this point explicitly when they say, "A
sequence of nucleotides or amino acids in a nucleic acid or a protein is a text
and the residues are letters. Reading is a general term for any process which
uses the sequence information in one palmer to produce a defined sequence in
another" (Neuberger, 7).
How much information is contained in a single human chromosome if this
r

information were written down in ordinary printed book fo�m in a modern
human language? Carl Sagan in his book The Dragons of Eden addresses this
question. To summarize Sagan's explanation: A single human chromosome
contains twenty billion bits of information. Assuming that human language has
no more than 64 individual characters (letters, numbers, and punctuation
marks), and that it would take no more than 6 bits (6 questions) to determine
any specific character, twenty billion bits are about equivalent to three
billion characters. If we assume that there are 6 letters in the average word

>.

and 300 words on the average page of a book, and 500 pages in the average
book, the information content of a single human chromosome would be roughly
equivalent to 4000 five hundred page books. (Sagan 1977, 25).
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This having been said, Popper does offer some criteria by which we may
speak of the degree of corroboration

of a theory.
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It is not simply the number

of corroborating instances which determines the degree of corroboration,
although this is taken into consideration, but the severity of the tests and the

...

degree of testability of the theory in question. The degree of testability is
directly proportional to the degree of falsifiability. Popper says, "In
appraising the degree of corroboration of a theory we take into account its
degree of falsifiability. A theory can be the better corroborated the better
testable it is" (Popper 1959, 269).
At no point does Popper equate corroboration with probability. In a
letter to Carnap in 1939 after Carnap's translation of Popper's term "degree
of corroboration" as "degree of confirmation" in his article "Testability and
Meaning" which appeared in Philosophy of Science (Vol. 3, 1936), Popper
expressed his displeasure because of the association of the idea of probability
and verification with Carnap's translation. (Popper 1959, 251).
In his essay entitled "The 'Corroboration' of Theories", Hilary Putnam
addresses Popper's idea of corroboration. Putnam says,
Although scientists, on Popper's view, do not make inductions, they do
"corroborate" scientific theories. And although the statement that a
theory is highly corroborated does not mean, according to Popper, that
the theory may be accepted as true, or even .as approximately true, or
even as probably approximately true, still, there is no doubt that most
readers of Popper read his account of corroboration as an account of
something like the verification of theories, in spite of his protests
(Schilpp 1974, 223).
Putnam points out that Popper's account of corroboration is not so
different from the standard inductivist account of confirmation. Recall
Popper's method of science. One is to derive certain basic statements
(predictions) and experimentally test them. If the prediction is false, then the
theory is falsified. If sufficiently many predictions are true and certain
boundary conditions are met, then the theory is highly corroborated. Putnam
says, "Popper does say that the 'surviving theory' is accepted - his account
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is, therefore,

an account

of the logic of accepting
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An Introduction

to Philosophy,
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of probability

that,

it is

claimed, provide an explanation of chance. Recall that only universal
statements fulfill Popper's criterion of falsifiability. Carl Hempel, in his book
,-,

entitled Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy
of Science writes,
But the distinction between law-like statements of strictly universal
form and those of probabilistic form pertains, not to the evidential
support of the statements in question, but to the claims made by them:
roughly speaking, the former attribute (truly or falsely) a certain
characteristic to all members of a certain class; the latter, to a specific
proportion of its members (Hempel 1948, 376-386).
Regarding natural spatial order, the explanation of chance or
co-incidence fails on two accounts. First, as I mentioned earlier when

...,

discussing atomic structure, there are instances of natural spatial order that
are all-pervasive. No doubt chance arrangements of physical objects do occur
in nature, but when these arrangements continually recur the explanation of
chance fails because we are able to formulate laws and make predictions as to
their recurrence. No doubt that by mere chance there could exist a lake such
that there could be a row of trees around the lake that alternated in a pattern

)

of maple, oak, and pine. Were we to come across such a lake with such an
_arrangement of trees, one acceptable explanation could be that this
arrangement occurred by mere chance. But if we continually observed similar
lakes with a similar arrangement of trees around them, the explanation of
chance would cease to be an acceptable explanation in light of other possible
explanations, such as intelligent design. Therefore the explanation of chance
in this instance conflicts with the established background knowledge of
predictability

....
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Self-ordering matter
Regarding premise (11), there is a major reason which indicates the
weakness of this explanation.
First, quantum physics has discovered that all elementary particles,
atoms, and even molecules are identical. In his book entitled The Emperor's
New Mind, Roger Penrose says,
..>

According to quantum mechanics, any two electrons must necessarily
be completely identical, and the same holds for any two protons and for
any two particles whatever, of any one particular kind. This is not
merely to say that there is no way of telling the particles apart: the
statement is considerably stronger than that. If an electron in a
person's brain were to be exchanged with an electron in a brick, then
the state of the system would be exactly the same as it was before, not
merely indistinguishable from it. The same holds for protons and for
any other kind of particle, and for whole atoms, molecules, etc.
(Penrose 1989, 25).
The significance of this is clear. If all elementary particles of atoms and

,.

molecules are identical in kind, how does premise (11) explain the fact that
some of these elementary particles become orderful patterns, i.e. atoms and
molecules, and some do not? Quantum physics does not recognize order and

>

disorder as intrinsic properties of elementary particles. There is no

>

recognized property in physics known as self-ordering matter. Clearly these

.r

,.
::.1

unconscious entities do not possess the capability within themselves of
creating order. If they did, then they would all be orderful.
The objection might be raised regarding the previous discussion of
spatial order in reference to atomic structure. It is true that atoms exhibit
order, but there is no evidence that this order is due to some intrinsic
property of the elementary constituents of the atoms. Therefore, premise (11)

,.

conflicts with established background knowledge.
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of Explanation,

the elimination

of specific motives and desires

of the universe

but not the general

know specifically

of human order,

is impossible.

I agree that the introduction
to the intelligent

instances

I submit that intelligent

of natural

order in the universe.

to the best explanation,

with established

background

design is the best explanation

intelligent

knowledge;

According

design

(1)

to the criteria

does not conflict

(2) has more evidence

supporting

it;

(3) has no evidence against it; (4) is simpler than any competing explanation.
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For further
discussion of intention and the Design
Swinburne, The Existence of God, pp. 54-64, 84.
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Argument

see

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Response
Given that intelligent
natural

order,

criticisms

Consider

species

first

argument

Hume 's initial

natural

both

considered

satisfy

respond

that

the

because

and human artifacts.

of

to the classical

comparison

of the

of the difference

in

We can see that

our

order is not affected by this criticism . Although we can
order

from human order,

the conditions

of the same species.

order require

criticism

is unjustified

the universe

from natural

distinguish

to the best explanation

from design ?

with human artifacts
between

order,

design is the inference

how does this account of the argument

of the argument

universe

to the Classical Criticisms

intelligent

design.

for being

when considering
order

and therefore

They only differ in origin.
Therefore,

order

qua

can be

All instances

of

the cause and effect relationship

is of the same type .
Since it is by repetition
justified,

and a generalization

that

any inference

is needed to inf er back to particular

Hume said that one would have to experience
a reasonable

conjecture

problem of induction.

the whole, and further

many universes

about the origin of our universe
This same idea is repeated

the illusion in concluding

to a generalization

anything

is

instances

,

in order to make

. This is of course the

by Hume when he speaks of

about the whole from any specific part of

when he argues against the inference
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that the designer

possesses infinite qualities. A similar point is discussed by Kant when he
speaks of the impossibility of deriving a necessary and all-sufficient being
from a pure empirical investigation. More recently we have seen this problem
discussed in reference to verificationism. No scientific theories are immune to
this criticism, including the competing explanations for natural order which
we have considered. Given these states of affairs, we have seen that
intelligent design is the best explanation of natural order.
Is there any more that can be reasonably expected from applying
scientific criteria in establishing the argument from design? I think the answer
to this question is negative. I do think, however, that a theist could argue for
a wider notion of acceptable evidence beyond that currently accepted by
scientific strictures. It is precisely these types of situations which expose the
narrow and arbitrary limiting nature of "acceptable" empirical evidence. 17
If, for example, one were to consider as admissible other evidence for
a creator and sustainer of the universe, such as personal religious experience
or revelation, then there is a great deal more one could reasonably conjecture
about the nature and origin of the intelligent design of the universe without
having experienced many other universes as Hume suggests is necessary. We
could conclude that if we desire to have our theory remain scientific, then we
must accept this limitation, as must all scientific theories.
Consider next Hume's criticism that even if the premises of the
argument from design are granted, the conclusion of only one designer is no
more probable than the conclusion of several designers. Again I think that the
theist could argue that given the constraints of "acceptable" empirical
17

See Peter A. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p.
82-120, 322-346; Galen Johnson, "Hartshorne's Argument Against Empirical
Evidence For Necessary Existence: An Evaluation, pp. 180-187.
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evidence

perhaps

Hume is correct,

appeal to Occam's Razor,

but,

a theist

given other arguments,

could argue on grounds

such as an

that there is only

one designer.
How does the revised
of disorder?
disorder
possibility

The theist

counts against

of the designer,

from design account

could argue

that Hume's criticism

the perfection

of the co-existence

not know the purpose

result

argument

of the designer

of intelligent

for the disorder,

so long as disorder

does not preclude

the

Since we do

this does not rule out the perfection

serves

a divine purpose.

the alternative

of self-ordering

matter or probability.
hypotheses

to the effect that

design and disorder.

Hume considers

3. 6, these alternative

for the instances

explanations

of natural

order

As has been argued

fail according

to the criteria

as the

in section

of inference

to

the best explanation.
Regarding

Kant's criticism that the most the argument

prove is the contingency
substance

of the world,

of the form of the world, not the contingency
I think that the theist would have to agree.

has been mentioned before,
in general

this is as much an indictment

as it is the argument

Regarding

Darwin's

theory

of evolution

from design,

following points.

there is strong

does not fulfill Popper's
scientific
evolution,
incorporate
18

theory.

18

requirement

I think

that a theist

But, as
theories

instances,
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pp:

is not a

of the theory

of

have chosen either

to

which ultimately leads to a priorism,
Darwin on Trial,

the

of evolution

and therefore

the proponents

which it

could argue

that the theory

of falsification

when dealing with falsification

See Phillip E. Johnson,

and the criticisms

evidence

Thus far in its history,

ad hoc hypotheses,

of scientific

of the

from design.

levels at the argument
First,

from design could

145-154.

or ignore

such instances until such time as suitable ad hoc hypotheses are found. But
in the spirit of philosophical inquiry, I will address the notion of natural
selection, even if it is couched in a pseudoscientific theory.
Many have argued that the idea of natural selection has not destroyed
the argument from design. In his article entitled "Did Darwin Destroy the
Design Argument?" James A. Sadowsky provides an argument in which natural
selection can be interpreted as evidence of intelligent design,
With the arrival of man there is another use for unselected variations.
Where the selection occurs directly or indirectly as the result of human
choice, it is not up to God which variation gets selected. The provision
of many variations each of which could survive in a different
environment improves the possibility of survival for a species despite
man's ability to produce a different environment from what was in the
original program (Sadowsk 1988, 100).
Because man has free will and therefore is not subject to the original
environmental program, the greater the repertoire of potential variations, the
greater the chance for survival given the freedom of human actions.
When viewed in this manner, even the most potent criticism offered by
the theory of evolution fails to render the argument from design impotent.
As I argued in section 3.4.1, it is also possible to formulate an argument
from instances of anatomical order which is immune to Darwin's criticisms.

Intelligent Design and God
What is the relationship between intelligent design of natural order and
the God of theism? Within the confines of scientific empiricism any conclusions
regarding this relationship must be tentative and minimal. Tentative because
of the problem of induction and currently acceptable empirical evidence, and
minimal because of the natural gulf between creator and creation.
If we employ the method of analogy, we might conclude, on the basis of
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the identity of all order, that the designer of natural order is like a human
designer in some way. I stress "in some way" because we only have the
instances of natural order to determine the similarities. The employment of
analogy brings more problems than it solves. Beyond this, I shall not
speculate.
The other alternative, one which I have argued for, is to realize that
the argument from design, as an empirical scientific theory concludes the most
that can be concluded within such a paradigm. With this understanding we
clearly see that these limitations are not intrinsic to the argument but the
specific paradigm we have chosen.
If we chose to include other types of evidence in addition to the
currently acceptable empirical evidence as per scientific empiricism, then our
conclusion will support the theist's position even better.
This paper began by asking whether all arguments for the existence of
God are "mere metaphysical speculation." In my attempt to argue that there
is an argument for the existence of God which is not "mere metaphysical
speculation," I have offered a reformulation of the argument from design such
that it fulfills the criteria of one of the major schools of scientific empiricism,
that of falsificationism. I therefore submit that not only is there a proof for
the existence of God which is not "mere metaphysical speculation," but the
stronger claim that St. Paul was correct in his letter to the Romans when he
said that there is clear evidence for the existence of God such that men are
"without excuse."
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